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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
It is common  in the  cognitive  neuroscience  literature  to explain  differences  in activation
in  terms  of differences  in  the  “efﬁciency”  of neural  function.  I argue  here  that  this  usage
of  the  concept  of  efﬁciency  is  empty  and  simply  redescribes  activation  differences  rather
than  providing  a useful  explanation  of  them.  I examine  a number  of possible  explanations
for  differential  activation  in  terms of  task  performance,  neuronal  computation,  neuronal
energetics,  and  network  organization.  While  the  concept  of “efﬁciency”  is vacuous  as  itKeyword:
Neuroimaging
Neural Energetics
Metabolism
fMRI
Response Time
is commonly  employed  in  the neuroimaging  literature,  an  examination  of brain  develop-
ment  in  the  context  of neural  coding,  neuroenergetics,  and network  structure  provides  a
roadmap  for future  investigation,  which  is  fundamental  to an  improved  understanding  of
developmental  effects  and group  differences  in  neuroimaging  signals.
©  2014  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NCNetworks
1. Introduction
As scientists we aim to help understand how the
world works, which generally means providing mechanis-
tic  explanations of natural phenomena. For example, the
synaptic  plasticity theory of memory proposes that mem-
ories  are created through the modulation of the strength
of  synapses between neurons via speciﬁc mechanisms
such as NMDA-dependent long-term potentiation. Such an
explanation  tells us something about the putative causal
structure of the mechanisms that generate the relevant
data, which supports the generation of predictions about
the  effects of particular experimental interventions. For
example, this theory predicts that manipulations that block
NMDA  receptor function should reduce the ability to form
new  memories (and indeed they do). In cognitive neuro-
science, we possess only a small number of theories with
similar  explanatory power. For example, in the last 50
years  memory research has moved from the initial estab-
lishment of the medial temporal lobe’s role in memory
∗ Tel.: +1 512 232 9504.
E-mail  address: poldrack@utexas.edu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2014.06.001
1878-9293/© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open acce
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(through the study of amnesic patients like H.M.) to a deep
understanding of the circuitry of the medial temporal lobe
and  the computational role of different subregions (Milner
et  al., 1998). However, in many other domains of cognitive
neuroscience, including developmental cognitive neuro-
science, some very commonly used explanations are far less
satisfying.
In  the present paper I will focus on the concept of
“efﬁciency” which is commonly used as an explanation in
cognitive  neuroscience. Perhaps the best known usage of
the  term comes from the “neural efﬁciency theory” of intel-
ligence  proposed by Haier and colleagues. For example:
A  series of investigations in normal subjects indi-
cate an inverse relationship between brain glucose
metabolic rate (GMR) and psychometric measures of
intelligence. . .These studies have been interpreted as
evidence for a brain efﬁciency model of intelligence:
Intelligence is not a function of how hard the brain
works but rather how efﬁciently it works. . . This efﬁ-
ciency may  derive from the disuse of many brain areas
irrelevant for good task performance as well as the more
focused use of speciﬁc task-relevant areas. (Haier et al.,
1992)
ss article under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/
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same amount of time, but with different intensity. For exam-
ple, in one group neurons in the relevant region ﬁre at
20 Hz for 100 ms,  while in the other group neurons ﬁre at
10 Hz for the same amount of time.R.A. Poldrack / Developmental C
Other examples are found throughout the literature
cross studies of development, aging, individual differ-
nces and learning.
“.  . .improved handwriting is associated with increased
computational efﬁciency or neural coding and hence
reduced BOLD signal increase in the right IFG for reading-
related functions.” (Gimenez et al., 2014).
“We  show that increased neural efﬁciency and capacity,
as reﬂected by more “youth-like” brain response pat-
terns in regions of interest of the frontoparietal WM
network, were associated with better behavioral training
outcome” (Heinzel et al., 2014).
“These  results suggest that lifelong bilingualism offsets
age-related declines in the neural efﬁciency for cognitive
control processes.” (Gold et al., 2013)
“.  . .activity was signiﬁcantly reduced for trained items
so that a further increase from two to three items was
observed. We  interpret this difference as a correlate of
a gain in neural efﬁciency. . .We  assume that training
causes a more efﬁcient neural representation of trained
items supported by long-term memory and this allows
holding more items in working memory.” (Zimmer et al.,
2012)
“These  results indicate that a short regimen of [work-
ing memory] training is associated with lower prefrontal
activation – a marker of neural efﬁciency – in divergent
thinking.” (Vartanian et al., 2013)
In  general, the term is used to describe situations where
erformance appears similar but activation is greater for
ne  group (which is taken to be “less efﬁcient”). It should
e  noted that there is a very different notion of efﬁciency
hat has arisen from the network analyses of brain connec-
ivity;  I discuss this further below, but here I am focused on
he  use of the concept to describe differences in univariate
ctivation.
.  Is “efﬁciency” really an explanation?
Upon closer examination it is clear that “efﬁciency”
enerally fails as a scientiﬁc explanation when used in
his  way. An analogy is instructive. Let’s say that we are
nterested in understanding individual differences in gas
ileage  between different makes of automobiles. We  per-
orm  an experiment in which we drive two cars (a hybrid
oyota Prius and a gas-only Porsche Carrera) from Los
ngeles to San Francisco along exactly the same route,
nd we measure their fuel consumption. The results of the
xperiment show that the Prius uses 1/2 as much fuel as the
orsche  to travel the same distance. Here are two possible
xplanations of this difference in fuel consumption:
. The Prius has a gas-electric hybrid engine (which uses
surplus engine power to generate electricity which is
then turned back into drive power) and regenerative
braking  (which captures energy that would otherwise
be lost as heat).
. The Prius is more efﬁcient. Neuroscience 11 (2015) 12–17 13
None of us would accept the latter as a suitable expla-
nation for the difference in fuel consumption; in fact, we
would  likely recognize immediately that the second “expla-
nation”  is not an explanation at all, but rather simply a
redescription of the data.
I  propose that the common usage of the concept of
“efﬁciency” in cognitive neuroscience is equally vacuous.
Looking back at the list of quotes above, in each case it is
apparent that the term “efﬁciency” is simply a redescrip-
tion of the phenomenon of reduced activation; although
it  sounds like it is explaining the result, it does not tell us
any  more about the mechanism, and implies no additional
experiments that one might do to test the explanation.
To the degree that we  judge a scientiﬁc explanation with
regard  to its production of new testable hypotheses, the
efﬁciency explanation fails completely when used in this
way.
This  is not to argue that concept of efﬁciency is intrin-
sically useless; to the contrary, a better understanding of
the  relation between energy expenditure and neural com-
putations is fundamental to understanding developmental
differences in neuroimaging signals. Take any developmen-
tal  experiment where groups are compared and differences
in  activation are observed on a particular comparison of
task  conditions. These differences could reﬂect any of the
following biological differences:
• A different set of cognitive processes is being performed. For
example, a child with Tourette syndrome participating in
an fMRI study is effectively in a dual task situation, per-
forming the speciﬁed cognitive task while also actively
attempting to suppress their tics, whereas a healthy child
would not experience this secondary response inhibition
demand.
• A different neural computation is performed to complete
the same task. For example, in an pseudoword pronun-
ciation task, one group pronounces the stimulus through
grapheme-to-phoneme conversion, while a more skilled
group pronounces it using analogy to known words.
Alternatively, one group represents a stimulus domain
using a dense coding scheme, whereas another repre-
sents it using sparse coding.
Neither of these captures what is generally meant by the
concept  of efﬁciency, i.e. reduced energy expenditure for
the  same work. However, there are several other potential
explanations that come closer to this concept:
• The  same neural computation is being performed for the• The  same neural computation is performed at the same
intensity, but for different lengths of time. For example, in
one group neurons ﬁre at 20 Hz for 100 ms,  while in the
other group the same neurons ﬁre at 20 Hz for 50 ms.
ognitive14 R.A. Poldrack / Developmental C
Finally, there is one explanation that comes closest
to capturing the essence of the concept of neural cost-
efﬁciency:
• The  same neural computation is performed with identical
time and intensity, but the metabolic expenditure differs
between the groups. For example, the groups could dif-
fer in the amount of transmitter release, the nature of
neurovascular coupling (e.g. due to differences in con-
tact between astrocytes and neurons), or the degree to
which they rely upon oxidative versus non-oxidative
metabolism.
The  point of laying out each of these other possibili-
ties is to highlight that while there is a way in which the
concept of efﬁciency can be well-speciﬁed as a plausible
explanation of activation differences that makes non-trivial
predictions, doing so requires confronting a number of dif-
ﬁcult  questions which are rarely if ever addressed in the
cognitive neuroscience literature.
3. Explaining differences in activation
Because many researchers in cognitive neuroscience
(including but not limited to developmental cognitive
neuroscientists) are fundamentally interested in under-
standing differences in brain activity between individuals
at  different points in time, we desperately need better
explanations for such differences (cf. Poldrack, 2000). Here
I  will outline in greater depth the potential explanations
for differential activation mentioned above.
3.1. Is the set of cognitive processes the same?
We nearly always assume that the cognitive processes
being performed by the subject are strictly deﬁned by the
experimental paradigm that the subject is presented with,
but  it is clear that this is often an invalid assumption. In
particular, the requirements of the fMRI acquisition envi-
ronment  (i.e. lying very still and quiet in a small tube for an
extended  period of time) represent a “meta-task” that the
subject  must perform in order to comply with the experi-
menter’s demands. Whereas most adults have little trouble
exerting the executive control necessary to accomplish this
meta-task,  for children or individuals with executive con-
trol  disorders one might consider the meta-task demands
to  essentially be a demanding secondary task. If the pri-
mary  task is one that engages cognitive processes that
overlap with the meta-task (e.g. response inhibition, work-
ing  memory), then one might expect interactions with the
experimental task that could result in activation differ-
ences (e.g. enhanced activation due to overload, or reduced
activation due to ceiling effects on activation). Similar con-
cerns  arise regarding differential task difﬁculty; if a task is
much  easier for one group than another, then differences
could reﬂect the fact that subjects in the easy group are
engaging in additional task-independent thought during
performance of the experimental task. Neuroscience 11 (2015) 12–17
3.2. Is the computation the same?
The next major question regarding the interpretation of
activation differences is whether the same neural compu-
tations are being performed. There are numerous ways in
which  the computations underlying task performance can
change  with learning and development. Most notable is the
fact  that as experience accrues, it is often possible to per-
form  a task based on memory for prior experiences rather
than  through application of rules or brute force computa-
tion (Logan, 1988). For example, there is a hypothesis in
reading  development that initial application of grapheme-
to-phoneme conversion rules is supplanted by direct access
to  phonological word forms from visual forms for famil-
iar  words (Grainger et al., 2012). Similarly, acquisition of
mirror-reading skill is thought to progress from initial
visuospatial transformation to later use of direct visual
recognition (Poldrack et al., 1998). If the computations
being performed differ between groups, then labeling the
differences as using “efﬁciency” is invalid because the work
being  performed differs; an analogy would be compar-
ing the fuel expended to travel from Los Angeles to San
Francisco, where one car travels via the interstate and the
other  follows the Paciﬁc Coast Highway.
Determining empirically whether the same computa-
tion is being performed is challenging because it rests on
accepting  a null hypothesis. Strategies could include the
use  of behavioral manipulations to assess the effects of
relevant variables on behavior. For example, in a mental
rotation task where the subject compares two block ﬁg-
ures  (Shepard and Metzler, 1971), one could measure the
slope  of response times as a function of the angle of rota-
tion;  major changes in this slope would suggest that the
task  is being performed in a different manner. Similarly
one might ask whether the same factors cause behavioral
interference between the groups. Using fMRI one might
attempt to establish whether different networks are active,
or  whether the same network is active to different degrees,
though this will be statistically challenging. Overall, it is
straightforward to show that different computations are
being  used but fundamentally challenging to show that the
computation has not changed.
Changes in the nature of neuronal information coding
could also result in differences in activation. In particular,
the concept of “efﬁcient coding” (Barlow, 1961) suggests
that  energy usage is minimized when information is coded
in  a way that reduces the redundancy of information across
neurons, which leads to the development of sparse codes
(cf.  Olshausen and Field, 1996). There has been little study
of  how the sparseness of neuronal coding changes with
development in mammalian cortex, but recent work has
demonstrated that sparseness of coding in ferret visual
cortex decreases rather than increases across develop-
ment (Berkes et al., 2011), which is inconsistent with the
decreased activation generally observed in the context of
developmental neuroimaging. Nonetheless, this suggests
that  in order to fully identify whether the same computa-
tion is being performed, it would be necessary to examine
the  way in which neural coding may  have changed. This is
rarely  possible in humans, but could be examined in animal
models.
R.A. Poldrack / Developmental Cognitive
Fig. 1. Differences in processing time are very difﬁcult to distinguish from
differences in intensity of activation. The thick black line reﬂects data
generated for four trials that vary in processing times (as listed in the
ﬁgure) through convolution with a standard SPM hemodynamic response
function. The dashed gray line reﬂects the results of ﬁtting a model to
those data in which differences between trials are based on the intensity
of the activation, using a ﬁxed duration of 400 ms  (with the ﬁtted intensity
for each trial presented as “beta” in the ﬁgure). The black and dashed gray
lines are almost indistinguishable (difference between these functions is
plotted  in blue), highlighting the fact that the effects of processing time
and activation intensity are for practical purposes indistinguishable, both
resulting in similarly increased activation. Code to generate this ﬁgure is
available from https://github.com/poldrack/rtmodel. (For interpretation
of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
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difference  in energy usage in the face of seemingly iden-eb  version of the article.)
.3. Intensity and timing are (nearly) indistinguishable
ith fMRI
We  can next ask how differences in intensity and tim-
ng  of neural signaling affect fMRI signals, and whether
hey can be distinguished. This is particularly pertinent
iven that experience and maturation both lead to the abil-
ty  to perform tasks more quickly, and it is rare to see a
euroimaging ﬁnding in these domains that is not accom-
anied by changes in response times, even in cases where
ne  has good reason to believe that the same computa-
ion is being performed. Further, these differences in time
n  task are associated with regionally speciﬁc differences
n  activation regardless of the speciﬁc task. For example,
Yarkoni et al., 2009) found that differences in response
ime (RT) between task conditions were associated with
ifferences in activation in prefrontal and other regions in
ve  different studies using different tasks. Unfortunately,
t is almost impossible to distinguish changes in activa-
ion  due to differential intensity from changes due to time
n  task. Fig. 1 shows that differences in activation timing
an  be mimicked almost exactly by differences in intensity,
hich leads to a fundamental difﬁculty in the interpreta-
ion of activation changes. Fortunately, RT can be measured
ndependently and used in the statistical model to correct
or  the effects of time on task (cf. Grinband et al., 2008), and
he  foregoing demonstration highlights the absolute neces-
ity  of such corrections. If RT is not modeled, then there
s  no way to know whether differences in activation are
ue  to differences in time on task versus true differences Neuroscience 11 (2015) 12–17 15
in  activation intensity. Conversely, if one shows activation
differences after having properly removed the effects of
time  on task across groups, then this provides some degree
of  conﬁdence that the results do indeed reﬂect differences
in  the level of activation intensity. However, even when RT
has  been modeled as a nuisance factor, it will be very dif-
ﬁcult  to fully remove its effects (e.g. due to nonlinearities)
and thus it will always be difﬁcult to interpret activation
differences that are accompanied by behavioral differences
in  RT.
4. Neural energetics and activation differences
As noted above, another possible explanation of activa-
tion  differences is that the computation remains the same
in  quality, time, and intensity, but the energy used to per-
form  the computation differs. This most closely approaches
the  usual meaning of the concept of efﬁciency, i.e. the
amount of energy needed to perform a given amount of
work.  There is a large number of biophysical mechanisms
by which the same neuronal ﬁring pattern could consume
a  differential amount of energy.
The energy “budget” for neuronal signaling in the
cerebral cortex involves action potentials (21%), synap-
tic  processes (59%), and resting potentials (20%) (Howarth
et  al., 2012). The energetic efﬁciency of action poten-
tials lies largely in the overlap of the inward (Na+)
and outward (K+) currents, and varies greatly between
classes of neurons; for example, squid giant axons are
highly inefﬁcient, whereas cortical and thalamic neurons
in  rodents are highly efﬁcient (Sengupta et al., 2010). Fur-
ther,  metabolic efﬁciency varies across different parts of
the  neuron (Hallermann et al., 2012). These data suggest
that any changes in neuronal structure could potentially
result in changes in energy usage; the time course of any
such  changes appears to be currently unknown. Similarly,
changes in the nature of synaptic signaling, such as the
well  known changes in synaptic density (i.e. “pruning”) that
accompany brain development along with changes in the
relative  abundance of NMDA receptors and metabotropic
signaling, could impact the relative efﬁciency of signaling
with development. These suggestions only scratch the
surface of the potential biophysical causes for differen-
tial energy efﬁciency of neuronal signaling; my  point is
simply  to highlight how little we  currently understand
about the potential causes of true differences in neural
efﬁciency.
Using a combination of neuronal recordings and 2DG,
Picard et al. (2013) recently demonstrated the ﬁrst evi-
dence  of experience-dependent changes in the energy
usage of neural activity. Monkeys were trained to perform
a  internally generated motor task over an extended period
(up  to 6 years), and then compared performance of this task
with  an untrained (visually guided) motor task. Neuronal
recordings in motor cortex revealed no differences in spike
rates  between the two  tasks, but 2-deoxy-glucose uptake
differed signiﬁcantly between the conditions, suggesting atical  neuronal computations. While this kind of approach
is  likely to remain unfeasible with human subjects (par-
ticularly with children), it does highlight the fact that
ognitive
brain  maturation.16 R.A. Poldrack / Developmental C
speciﬁc hypotheses about the relation between neuronal
computation and energetics can be addressed using exist-
ing  methods in nonhuman animal models. It may  also
be  possible to address some of these questions through
combinations of imaging and stimulation techniques in
humans.
Another  potentially interesting source of developmen-
tal differences in energetic efﬁciency is the degree to which
brain  activity relies upon different energetic mechanisms
across development. Neurons can rely upon a number of
different  energetic pathways, including oxidative phos-
phorylation (Kety, 1957; Sibson et al., 1998; Sokoloff,
1960), aerobic glycolysis (Fox et al., 1988), and metabolism
of  ketone bodies (Sokoloff, 1973), which vary greatly in
their  energetic efﬁciency (e.g. oxidative phosphorylation
can generate 15 times more ATP than glycolysis using the
same  amount of glucose; Fox et al. (1988)). The brain’s
use of these different energetic pathways is known to vary
with  development. In particular, a recent meta-analysis by
Goyal  et al. (2014) showed that aerobic glycolysis is greatly
increased during childhood, and that regional increases in
glycolysis  are associated with expression of genes related
to  synaptic development. There are also known changes
in  the expression of genes relevant to energetics, such as
the  glucose transporter (Vannucci and Vannucci, 2000). A
better  understanding of developmental changes in neural
energetics across development and their relation to func-
tional  imaging signals could provide important calibration
to  help understand the degree to which development
effects in imaging studies reﬂect neuronal versus energetic
differences, in the same way that studies of neurovas-
cular coupling in aging have helped provide guidance in
the  interpretation of aging-related imaging signals (e.g.,
Gazzaley and D’Esposito, 2004)
5. Network efﬁciency
The  total amount of energy consumed by neuronal com-
putations depends not just upon the function of individual
neurons, but also on how those neurons are connected
to one another. With the advent of graph-theoretical
approaches to the analysis of neuroimaging data (Bullmore
and  Sporns, 2009), there is increasing evidence regarding
the  cost-efﬁciency of large-scale brain network structure
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2012), where “efﬁciency” in this
case  is deﬁned in terms of cost of transmitting informa-
tion within the network. In particular, it appears that brain
networks are organized in a way that approaches the max-
imum  possible cost-efﬁciency, though the embedding of
complex  topological structure that maximizes complexity
while minimizing transmission costs (Bassett et al., 2010).
This  approach provides an alternative but well-formulated
conception of “efﬁciency” that can be tested using both
structural and functional MRI  data.
Recent work has begun to examine individual differ-
ences in the efﬁciency of brain network structure and
function. Cao et al. (2014) measured the topological efﬁ-
ciency  of resting state networks in a group of participants
ranging from 7 to 87 years old, where efﬁciency is deﬁned
as  the inverse of the mean path length between each pair
of  nodes in the network (Latora and Marchiori, 2001). They Neuroscience 11 (2015) 12–17
found  no relation between age and the overall efﬁciency of
brain  networks, whereas there was  an inverted-u shaped
relation between age and local efﬁciency (which is the aver-
age  efﬁciency of the subnetwork formed by each node).
Similarly, a study of children from 5 to 18 years of age
showed no relation between global efﬁciency and age but a
positive  relationship between local efﬁciency and age (Wu
et  al., 2013) (cf. also Supekar et al., 2009). Similar results
have appeared for structural connectivity. For example,
Dennis et al. (2013) examined global and local efﬁciency
of  structural networks identiﬁed using diffusion tensor
imaging in a large sample ranging from 12 to 30 years of
age,  and found no relation between global efﬁciency and
age  but a signiﬁcant relation between local efﬁciency in
a  number of regions (including hub-like regions such as
posterior  cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex). A study
of  the very early development of brain networks based on
gray  matter volume showed that global efﬁciency increases
gradually from one month of age to two years (Fan et al.,
2011).  Together these data begin to suggest that while
global efﬁciency reaches adult-like levels fairly early in
development, local efﬁciency continues to change across
the  span of development. One current unknown is how
these  changes in local network efﬁciency might related to
changes  in task activation; this is an important question for
future  research. In addition, developmental differences in
resting  state connectivity may  suffer from the same prob-
lems  noted above regarding task activation; in particular,
children may  require greater effort to engage the meta-task
of  remaining still during the scan, which would presumably
affect network structure.
6.  Conclusion
“Efﬁciency” is such a facile explanation that it is easy to
miss  the emptiness that is inherent in its usual application
to  neuroimaging data. This is not uncommon when every-
day  terms are used to describe psychological phenomena.
For example, Navon (1984) made a very compelling argu-
ment  that the concept of “mental resources” (which was
commonly used by cognitive psychologists in the 1970s
and  remains in common usage amongst cognitive neuro-
scientists) was similarly non-explanatory, a “soup stone”
in  his parlance. Here I have laid out the problems with
the  concept of efﬁciency as it is usually applied within the
neuroimaging literature, and examined a number of alter-
native  explanations for differences in activation signals.
This  analysis uncovers deep problems for the interpreta-
tion of developmental changes in neuroimaging signals,
and  highlights the need for additional work using animal
models to examine the ways in which neuronal energet-
ics  change in concert with developmental experience andConﬂict of interest statement
The  author has no conﬂicts of interest to declare for this
manuscript.
ognitive
A
S
e
R
B
B
B
B
B
C
D
F
F
G
G
G
G
G
G
H
correlates of trial-by-trial reaction time variability in gray and whiteR.A. Poldrack / Developmental C
cknowledgments
Thanks to Jessica Church-Lang, Sarah Helﬁnstein, Tom
chonberg, and Tal Yarkoni for helpful comments on an
arlier  draft.
eferences
arlow, H., 1961. Possible principles underlying the transformation
of sensory messages. In: Sensory Communication., pp. 217–234,
http://redwood.berkeley.edu/w/images/f/fd/02-barlow-pr-1954.pdf
assett, D.S., Greenﬁeld, D.L., Meyer-Lindenberg, A., Weinberger, D.R.,
Moore, S.W., Bullmore, E.T., 2010. Efﬁcient physical embedding of
topologically complex information processing networks in brains and
computer circuits. PLoS Comput. Biol. 6 (4), e1000748.
erkes, P., Orb’an, G., Lengyel, M.,  Fiser, J., 2011. Spontaneous cortical activ-
ity  reveals hallmarks of an optimal internal model of the environment.
Science 331 (6013), 83–87.
ullmore, E., Sporns, O., 2009. Complex brain networks: graph theoretical
analysis of structural and functional systems. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10
(3), 186–198.
ullmore, E., Sporns, O., 2012. The economy of brain network organization.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 13 (5), 336–349.
ao, M., Wang, J.-H., Dai, Z.-J., Cao, X.-Y., Jiang, L.-L., Fan, F.-M., Song, X.-W.,
Xia, M.-R., Shu, N., Dong, Q., Milham, M.P., Castellanos, F.X., Zuo, X.-N.,
He, Y., 2014. Topological organization of the human brain functional
connectome across the lifespan. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 7, 76–93.
ennis,  E.L., Jahanshad, N., McMahon, K.L., de Zubicaray, G.I., Martin, N.G.,
Hickie, I.B., Toga, A.W., Wright, M.J., Thompson, P.M., 2013. Devel-
opment of brain structural connectivity between ages 12 and 30: a
4-Tesla diffusion imaging study in 439 adolescents and adults. Neu-
roimage 64, 671–684.
an,  Y., Shi, F., Smith, J.K., Lin, W.,  Gilmore, J.H., Shen, D., 2011. Brain
anatomical networks in early human brain development. Neuroimage
54 (3), 1862–1871.
ox,  P.T., Raichle, M.E., Mintun, M.A., Dence, C., 1988. Nonoxidative glu-
cose consumption during focal physiologic neural activity. Science
241 (4864), 462–464.
azzaley,  A., D’Esposito, M.,  2005. BOLD functional MRI  and cognitive
aging. In: Cabeza, R., Nyberg, L., Park, D. (Eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience
of Aging: Linking Cognitive and Cerebral Aging. Oxford University
Press, New York, NY, US, pp. 107–131.
imenez, P., Bugescu, N., Black, J.M., Hancock, R., Pugh, K., Nagamine, M.,
Kutner, E., Mazaika, P., Hendren, R., McCandliss, B.D., Hoeft, F., 2014.
Neuroimaging correlates of handwriting quality as children learn to
read and write. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8, 155.
old, B.T., Kim, C., Johnson, N.F., Kryscio, R.J., Smith, C.D., 2013. Lifelong
bilingualism maintains neural efﬁciency for cognitive control in aging.
J.  Neurosci. 33 (2), 387–396.
oyal,  M.S., Hawrylycz, M.,  Miller, J.A., Snyder, A.Z., Raichle, M.E., 2014.
Aerobic glycolysis in the human brain is associated with development
and neotenous gene expression. Cell Metab. 19 (1), 49–57.
rainger,  J., Lété, B., Bertand, D., Dufau, S., Ziegler, J.C., 2012. Evidence for
multiple routes in learning to read. Cognition 123 (2), 280–292.
rinband,  J., Wager, T.D., Lindquist, M.,  Ferrera, V.P., Hirsch, J., 2008.
Detection of time-varying signals in event-related fMRI designs. Neu-
roimage 43 (3), 509–520.aier,  R.J., Siegel, B., Tang, C., Abel, L., Buchsbaum, M.S., 1992. Intel-
ligence and changes in regional cerebral glucose metabolic rate
following learning. Intelligence 16 (3–4), 415–426 (Special Issue: Biol-
ogy and Intelligence) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/016028969290018M Neuroscience 11 (2015) 12–17 17
Hallermann,  S., de Kock, C.P.J., Stuart, G.J., Kole, M.H.P., 2012. State and
location dependence of action potential metabolic cost in cortical
pyramidal neurons. Nat. Neurosci. 15 (7), 1007–1014.
Heinzel, S., Lorenz, R.C., Brockhaus, W.-R., Wüstenberg, T., Kathmann, N.,
Heinz,  A., Rapp, M.A., 2014. Working memory load-dependent brain
response predicts behavioral training gains in older adults. J. Neurosci.
34 (4), 1224–1233.
Howarth, C., Gleeson, P., Attwell, D., 2012. Updated energy budgets for
neural computation in the neocortex and cerebellum. J. Cereb. Blood
Flow Metab. 32 (7), 1222–1232.
Kety,  S.S., 1957. The general metabolism of the brain in vivo. In:
Metabolism of the Nervous System., pp. 221–237.
Latora, V., Marchiori, M.,  2001. Efﬁcient behavior of small-world networks.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 87 (19), 198701.
Logan, G.D., 1988. Toward an instance theory of automatization. Psychol.
Rev. 95, 492–527.
Milner, B., Squire, L.R., Kandel, E.R., 1998. Cognitive neuroscience and the
study of memory. Neuron 20 (3), 445–468.
Navon, D., 1984. Resources: a theoretical soup stone? Psychol. Rev. 91,
16–22.
Olshausen, B.A., Field, D.J., 1996. Natural image statistics and efﬁcient
coding. Network 7 (2), 333–339.
Picard, N., Matsuzaka, Y., Strick, P.L., 2013. Extended practice of a motor
skill is associated with reduced metabolic activity in M1.  Nat. Neurosci.
16 (9), 1340–1347.
Poldrack, R.A., 2000. Imaging brain plasticity: conceptual and method-
ological issues – a theoretical review. Neuroimage 12 (1), 1–13.
Poldrack,  R.A., Desmond, J.E., Glover, G.H., Gabrieli, J.D., 1998. The neural
basis of visual skill learning: an fMRI study of mirror reading. Cereb.
Cortex 8 (1), 1–10.
Sengupta,  B., Stemmler, M.,  Laughlin, S.B., Niven, J.E., 2010. Action poten-
tial energy efﬁciency varies among neuron types in vertebrates and
invertebrates. PLoS Comput. Biol. 6, e1000840.
Shepard, R.N., Metzler, J., 1971. Mental rotation of three-dimensional
objects. Science 171 (3972), 701–703.
Sibson, N.R., Dhankhar, A., Mason, G.F., Rothman, D.L., Behar, K.L., Shulman,
R.G., 1998. Stoichiometric coupling of brain glucose metabolism and
glutamatergic neuronal activity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 95 (1),
316–321.
Sokoloff, L., 1960. The metabolism of the central nervous system in
vivo. Handbook of Physiology – Neurophysiology, vol. 3., pp. 1843–
1864.
Sokoloff, L., 1973. Metabolism of ketone bodies by the brain. Annu. Rev.
Med. 24, 271–280.
Supekar, K., Musen, M., Menon, V., 2009. Development of large-scale func-
tional brain networks in children. PLoS Biol. 7 (7), e1000157.
Vannucci,  R.C., Vannucci, S.J., 2000. Glucose metabolism in the developing
brain. Semin. Perinatol. 24 (2), 107–115.
Vartanian, O., Jobidon, M.-E., Bouak, F., Nakashima, A., Smith, I., Lam, Q.,
Cheung, B., 2013. Working memory training is associated with lower
prefrontal cortex activation in a divergent thinking task. Neuroscience
236, 186–194.
Wu,  K., Taki, Y., Sato, K., Hashizume, H., Sassa, Y., Takeuchi, H., Thyreau,
B., He, Y., Evans, A.C., Li, X., Kawashima, R., Fukuda, H., 2013. Topo-
logical organization of functional brain networks in healthy children:
differences in relation to age, sex, and intelligence. PLoS ONE 8 (2),
e55347.
Yarkoni, T., Barch, D.M., Gray, J.R., Conturo, T.E., Braver, T.S., 2009. Boldmatter: a multistudy fMRI analysis. PLoS ONE 4 (1), e4257.
Zimmer,  H.D., Popp, C., Reith, W.,  Krick, C., 2012. Gains of item-speciﬁc
training in visual working memory and their neural correlates. Brain
Res. 1466, 44–55.
